The Unmaking and Making of an American People

In 2019, fifteen scholars and public intellectuals penned a manifesto in First Things announcing the end of the old conservative neo-liberal consensus characterized by libertarian economics, individualism, and liberal ideology. Describing themselves as proponents of the “new nationalism,” their priorities were to attend “messy demands of authentic human attachments.” The new nationalism does not necessarily represent a cohesive set of policies or ideological homogeneity. Yet the 2019 manifesto articulated a common cause. The new nationalism represents a confluence of post-liberal theology and the post-liberal philosophical and political movement, both of which are reactions to the Enlightenment turn to the subject, individualism, and the dissolution of community life. They emphasized the universal “human need for a common life.”

Since 2019, the new nationalists—many Catholic and Evangelical—have advocated for a politics of strong attachments undergirded by common traditions—cultural, religious, civic—as the basis for a we. Moreover, they assert that strong immigration enforcement is requisite for the preservation of the bonds of social life.

This assertion runs up against an unfortunate fact: immigration enforcement as it exists takes the form of the destruction of ties to family, people, and place. In what follows I seek to understand the nature of the nationalists’ “strong attachments” through the lens of immigration enforcement. I conclude that the unmaking of a people—through mass deportation, denaturalization, dehumanization etc.—becomes the means to making a “new renditions” of American peoplehood. Furthermore, I argue that the violence of unmaking a people is, at its core, the same as that of the liberal state that the Catholic and Evangelical nationalists deride.

Authentic Attachments and the Bonds of Civic Life

Advocates of the new nationalism Kevin Stuart and David Albertson have interpreted populist and nationalist trends in the U.S. and Europe as responses to a contemporary attenuation of identity and community in the face of cultural, economic, political, and intellectual forces. They have identified their concern: the loss of attachment in “the West.” They advocate the recovery of “strong [national] attachments.” Taking up against the “deracinating forces of cosmopolitanism,” they state that:

Our problems as a country are not attachments that are too strong and restrictive, but too weak. Our problems are the interrelated loss of understanding of, and love for, the regime marked by the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution and nested in a context shaped by the English common law tradition, the natural law tradition, Protestant covenantal theology, classical republicanism and (yes, even) liberal political philosophy. Attachment to that regime and its polity, and active preference for it above others is what we mean by nationalism.

Rusty Reno’s Return of the Strong Gods argues that in the post-WWII era the consensus opinion was that strong attachments—to God, nation, culture—lead to violence. Reno articulates concerns that many of us share about the dissolution of community, in his description the loss of strong attachments, which is a comprehensive set of phenomena: neoliberal economics, mass migration, multiculturalism, loss of cultural bonds that tie people together, weak truth claims. Reno affirms that we need the “strong gods,” that is, “the objects of men’s love and devotion, the sources of the passions and loyalties that unite societies.” The gods that Reno invokes are the governing powers with “tinctures with divine legitimacy,” cultural norms, national myths and legends, reverence toward the founding fathers, the public monuments and memorials, and parades and civic celebrations.

He is aware of the danger these can become idols; nevertheless, tearing them down undermines civic unity. Reno says, “Our shared loves—love of our land, our history, our founding myths, our warriors and heroes—raise us to a higher vantage point.” I want to affirm Reno’s observation of the importance of common loves. Yet, an Augustinian objection should be raised: “Ac per hoc, si res publica res est populi et populus non est, qui consensu non sociatus est iuris, non est autem ius, ubi nulla iustitia est, procul dubio colligitur, ubi iustitia non est, non esse rem publicam”: “Consequently, if the republic is the good of the people, and there is no people if it be not associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and if there is no right where there is no justice, then most certainly it follows that there is no republic where there is no justice” (Augustine, De civitate Dei contra paganos, 19.21). If land we are on was stolen and our national heroes perpetrated its theft, our shared love for these heroes constitutes a celebration of injustice.

The new nationalism is invested in the notion that immigration attenuates the strong attachments to people, culture, and place required to preserve a sovereign American people. Kevin Stuart and Matthew Peterson contend theirs is obviously a nationalism that is open to all races and to immigrants, and that they “deny even the coherent possibility of what they [critics] call ethnonationalism in the United States as anything other than a fringe fantasy.” Yet, they also see immigrants as threats to American peoplehood. The “reason to seek immigration restriction: national unity.” “We now have record numbers of the foreign born within our borders,” who, they claim, are difficult to assimilate.

Legal theorist Adrian Vermeule, certainly not an uncritical ally of the new nationalism, has embraced a concordant position on immigration. Vermeule describes himself as an integralist. While Vermeule does not embrace nationalism as an ideal form, he views “populist nationalism” as superior than “the destabilizing and homogenizing imperialism of transatlantic liberalism.” In concord with the new nationalists, he opposed birthright citizenship on the grounds of its supposedly absurd legal consequences:

The illegal alien is a line-jumper and a violator of sovereign borders, a thief of both time and space, and generally speaking a thief may pass no valid title to stolen goods. Of course the child of an illegal alien is innocent of any personal wrongdoing, but the problem is that the parents lack the kind of lawful status that could ground transmission to their descendants of the citizenship, and the share of sovereignty, to which the parents are not themselves entitled.

Given the settler origins of the United States, to describe the undocumented immigrant as a thief is, in the words of Reid Locklin, an “incredible act of projection” (Reid Locklin in conversation with the author. May 29, 2026). Bracketing the question of legal theory, Vermeule’s intervention is intended to safeguard the “sovereign [American] people” by tightening the criteria for membership from geographic origin to familial descent.

Reno is even more explicit about the claim that immigration poses a risk to “We the People.” For Reno, we live in a “body politic threatened by disintegration, under blows from external enemies or because of internal conflicts and contradictions.” For Reno, the we of civic life is a family and group identity. This collective is “political solidarity [infused by] sacred significance.” It is our inheritance, unser Bestand. There is some tension here concerning what this inheritance is comprised of. Reno describes it as a bond closer than a shared humanity or biology. It is “something thicker than blood—a union of shared loves.” This collective identity is something that is cultural and affective, it elicits from us virtue and sacrifice. Reno does not want to reduce this collective to a shared biological or inheritance or racial identity. He explains, “The ‘we’ is not natural—that is, it is not simply a consequence of our shared humanity or a biological dynamic of genetic connection—its particularity requires intentional effort to create, guide, and sustain.” Because this group identity requires cultivation, Reno believes that it cannot be ethnic or racial.

We know, however, that ethnicity and race are not natural realities embedded in DNA but rather require cultivation through juridical and legal frameworks, cultural partitions, and practices of exclusion. Reno explains that the we is an inheritance received through linguistic, historical, and ancestral inheritances, and a homeland. But these are the markers of ethnic identity. Despite his insistence on the we as a union of loves, Reno has framed it in more or less ethnic terms. It is a people group that is inherently insecure and, therefore, must be fostered internally and be policed from outside threats.

Where “mass immigration and demographic change” are understood as self-evident threats, immigrants are construed as external enemies. Not all Catholic and Evangelical new nationalists have endorsed every feature of the contemporary immigration-industrial complex and policies of the current administration, but they have largely endorsed its anti-immigrant objectives and fail to oppose its policies in any meaningful way.

“They Are Eating Dogs and Cats”

Catholic Vice-President of the United States J.D. Vance translated outlandish claims on social media into public policy when he affirmed in a Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee hearing regarding the Haitian population of Springfield, Ohio: “Reports now show that people have had their pets abducted and eaten by people who shouldn’t be in this country.” Vance’s falsehood is meant to provoke a visceral response, to make one feel that Haitian immigrants constitute threats to the local social fabric. Yet, the Haitian population of Springfield is integral to the social fabric of this midwestern city.

The Haitian population of Springfield, Ohio, is a community made up of TPS holders, American citizens, and those who have other migrant statuses. They are business owners, school kids, homeowners, factory workers, and primarily Catholics and Evangelicals. Springfield was a city abandoned by industry and in decline; welcoming a new group of people was a beginning of revitalization for everyone in the city. Haitians have made their home in Springfield, Ohio and, by all accounts, have almost doubled city revenue, and revitalized the city. Their presence has a substantive positive relationship to the civic good. The churches in Springfield are centers of Haitian religious life and civic learning, which hold ESL classes and have close coordination with civic organizations that work for education, job training, ESL, driving workshops, and mentoring. In other words, they are people with undeniably robust ties to people and place. They are a people with strong attachments that tie them here.

Ohio has become a major hub for the expansion of immigration detention. Enforcement appears to be racially selective. The conditions are dehumanizing. The American Immigration Council and Advocates for Basic Legal Equality examined the records of the Sandusky Bay Border Patrol station in a 2024 report. It told of a family traveling by car from Chicago, where they attended a wedding, to their home in Maryland in 2017. They were stopped by the Ohio State Highway Patrol with a United States Border Patrol (USBP) officer riding along. The driver had a valid Maryland license.

However, the USBP officer ran a check on the immigration status on everyone in the car which revealed that the parents were undocumented and the children, ages four and seven, were U.S. citizens. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) recommended releasing the family and putting the parents in removal proceedings, but the USBP kept them in custody overnight. They issued an arrest warrant for the parents the next day, denied them bond, and arranged the county Child Protective Services to collect the children. At 10:50 AM the parents told USBP agents that a family member was getting the children. At 12:45 Child Protective Services took the children. The USBP agents transported the parents to Seneca County Jail, a facility that contracts with ICE. The Border Patrol was ostensibly enforcing immigration law. Yet, the USBP made choices substantively aimed at breaking up the family.

The incident in Ohio is iconic for what is happening broadly. The Brookings Institution’s recent report estimates 146,635 U.S. citizen children have had parents detained. More to the point, the current administration’s policy is not to detain and deport primarily violent criminals but rather people with family members who are citizens, citizens who are dependents of non-citizens, and who have work, family, friends, and communities here. Pope Leo, responding to a question about migrant detainees in Chicago, said: “many people who have lived for years and years” in the U.S., “never causing problems,” are “deeply affected” by the government’s policy of mass deportations.

Rival Solidarities and the Making of a People

I have been trying to use the lens of migration to view the new nationalists’ understanding of the bonds that secure “We the People.” The people is a unity forged by “shared loves” that requires protection from immigrants. Yet the most conspicuous feature of immigration enforcement today is its violence against shared loves, the family, attachments to place, and bonds between citizen and undocumented. The new nationalists legitimate invasive modes of immigration enforcement that are financially costly to the public, destructive to local communities, and feature ostentatious violence, resulting in injuries and killing of American citizens (Operation Metro Surge in Minneapolis for example). The destruction of shared loves becomes the means to secure shared loves. I am suggesting that immigration enforcement should be understood a part of a set of technologies of unmaking and making of the People.

The emergence of modern liberal republics coincided with the destruction of rival ways of being a people. Taking ekklesia in its Greek meaning, as a mode of assembly, Paul Christopher Johnson attends to how assemblies have been formed in the Americas. These are the processes by which individuals become a people, that is, how state and church bind and exclude through various “techniques of convening.” Johnson considers how the new Brazilian republic—emerging from the abolition of slavery, the republic’s founding, the death of Emperor Pedro II, and the separation of church and state in the 1880s—reimagined and shaped national belonging. In this decade, Canudos, a large frontier shanty town 1,000 miles from the capital Rio de Janeiro, was understood as a threat to that belonging.

Many of the residents of Canudos were refugees from the plantation life. Its religious and political leader, Antônio Conselheiro, believed that the new Brazilian republic as the Antichrist, rejected its separation of church and state, and declared its laws as the “Law of the Hound.” Antônio Conselheiro was an ultramontane, placing himself in opposition with ecclesial and political authorities in Rio de Janeiro and the emerging republican government. His message, however, was primarily spiritual and directed to the poor, and directed his followers on how to live an authentically Christian life. From the perspective of the republic, Canudos stood for “a refusal of the idea that a lawful polity and governance could not exist outside the republican state.” From 1896–97, the Brazilian army was sent to conquer Canudos and was turned away three times by its villagers. The fourth time the republic sent 30,000 soldiers who destroyed the city, killed most of the residents, and took Antônio Conselheiro’s head back to the capital.

Johnson elaborates several “techniques of making and unmaking social orders that install new renditions of the People” in Brazil. First, the sensorium of the republic commenced upon the city’s ruins: the Brazilian army played the patriotic-religious music of the republic, raised the flags, and sang the national anthem. This was the “sensorial eclipse of Canudo’s religious practices by republican sights and sounds.” Second, the media of the republic cast the people of Canudos as a “fanatical horde.” Johnson explains that the Portuguese word o povo, the people, connects a group with place and land. Antonio referred in sermons to his hearers as the people. Republican accounts of Canudos at the time contrasted the people with the o povão, the desclassificados, the masses of people who did not own land. These masses made up of Afro-Brazilians, Indigenous, and mixed-race people were presented as “dangerously mixed—religiously, socially, and racially—and so illegible and illegitimate candidates to join the republic.” They cannot fit the social and racial ordering of the republic. Third, the spectacle of violence against Canudos, including the beheading of those captured, was a “form of enunciation and communication.”

The techniques that Johnson elaborates have parallels across U.S. history, most intensely in the efforts at unmaking Indigenous peoplehood either by spectacles of violence or through pastoral projects of civilization. The liberal republics emerged in both Brazil and the U.S. through the dissolution of other solidarities and other ways of convening as a people. In The Rediscovery of America, Ned Blackhawk indicates that the U.S. Constitution primarily functioned as remedy to the ineffectualness of the federal government in responding to rival sovereignties—Indigenous and settler—within the United States interior. Paul Christopher Johnson, Pamela E. Klassen, and Winnifred Fallers Sullivan explain that in the formation of modern nations “what was required was not just the technology of converting humans into the people, then, but the inverse too, the technologies of unmaking extant, parallel, and rival sovereignties.”

Given this history, we might consider the current violence against migrants in continuity with the early republican attacks on rival ways of being a people. Anti-immigrant rhetoric casts migrants as a horde, religiously and morally unassimilable and dangerous to our American peoplehood. Immigration enforcement is functioning to disappear migrants into detention centers, producing hypervisibility and invisibility, and annexing the space in between. The separation of children from parents, deportations of the undocumented and documented and citizen alike, the violent invasions of American cities by armed federal forces—these are techniques of unmaking strong attachments and shared loves of communities in Minneapolis, Newark, Springfield, and other cities.

The New Nationalists are not wrong to find deeply problematic the centrifugal economic and social forces at work that are destructive of social life. Yet, they disdainfully ignore the violence inflicted on older forms of assembly to forge an American peoplehood. As a result, they imagine an originary sovereign American people, then attribute national disunity to the movement of people purportedly unassimilable.

Yet, it is evident that migrants have profound attachments to American people and places. They have them in abundance—and that is the problem. For the new nationalism, immigrants possess rival bonds that must be destroyed for the rendition of an American sovereign people to live. Those bonds are the ones we share. Immigrants are members of our communities. We share their loves. This is why, as Vince Miller says, “ordinary people risk their lives in the streets to care for those who are not kin, but neighbor nonetheless.”[1]


[1] Quoting the original submitted draft of Miller’s article, the language of which was changed in editing.

Church Life Journal | Articles

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.